Lebanon and Türkiye… From the Memory of the Sultanate to the Imperatives of Geography and Interests



A Reading of Eight Decades of Relations Between Two Countries Brought Together by History, Separated by Transformations, and Brought Closer Again by Interests

Attorney Michel Fallah

The visit of Bilal Erdoğan, son of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, to Lebanon comes at a time when the region is witnessing a redrawing of political and strategic balances. And if the visit, which carries a social and cultural character, has raised differing readings regarding its political dimensions, it offers an opportunity to revisit the history of Lebanese-Turkish relations, away from immediate impressions and inherited sensitivities, and in light of the interests that bind the two countries.

The relationship between Lebanon and Türkiye is far older than the Lebanese Republic, and deeper than the political transformations Ankara has witnessed in recent decades. It is a relationship that cannot be understood without returning to the Ottoman history, then to the independence phase, the Lebanese war, and up to the major transformations that restored Türkiye as a pivotal player in the Middle East.

From Sultanate to Republic: A Complex Historical Memory

Lebanese territories were under Ottoman rule from 1516 until the end of World War I in 1918. Over four centuries, forms of administration and relations with the central authority varied, from local emirates to the system of the Mutasarrifate of Mount Lebanon, established in 1861, which enjoyed relative administrative autonomy within the Sultanate.

That period was not uniform in all its chapters. It knew periods of stability and commercial prosperity, particularly in Beirut, which during the 19th century became a major port in the Eastern Mediterranean. But it also witnessed internal conflicts, external interventions, and varying levels of governance and administration.

The final years of Ottoman rule, during World War I, left deep wounds in the Lebanese memory, particularly the Great Famine and the executions carried out by the Ottoman authorities against national figures in 1916.

However, reading that era requires distinguishing between the Ottoman Sultanate and the modern Turkish Republic founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1923. History, however harsh it may have been, should not turn into a permanent judgment on the relations between states and peoples.

1943 – 1975: Quiet Relations Amid Different Priorities

With Lebanon’s independence in 1943, relations with Türkiye began to take their natural character between two independent states, although they remained limited in political presence. The Republic of Türkiye, with its secular and Western orientation, was preoccupied with consolidating its position in the Atlantic system, particularly after joining NATO in 1952. Lebanon, for its part, sought to reconcile its Arab belonging with its Western relations, under a political system based on delicate internal balances.

That phase witnessed no major bilateral disputes, but it also knew no advanced strategic partnership. Relations were essentially limited to diplomatic representation, trade exchange, and cultural communication.

An early indication of the regularity of bilateral relations was the exchange of diplomatic notes in Beirut in 1946 concerning visas for holders of diplomatic, special, and official passports, which entered into force in early 1947.

The divergence of regional priorities was a key factor in keeping relations within their traditional framework, without becoming a central axis in the foreign policy of either country.

1975 – 1990: The Lebanese War and a Phase of Limited Presence

With the outbreak of the Lebanese war in 1975, the country entered a long phase of political and security disintegration, which was reflected in its foreign relations. Unlike regional countries that became directly involved in the Lebanese conflict, Türkiye maintained a relatively limited political presence, turning to its internal challenges and to the Cyprus file and its relations with the West and the Soviet Union.

Ankara was not, at that stage, a key party in Lebanese equations, nor was Lebanon a priority in its regional policy. With the end of the war and the adoption of the Taif Agreement in 1989, a new phase of rebuilding the Lebanese state began, coinciding later with profound transformations in Turkish foreign policy.

From the 1990s to 2010: The Beginning of the Great Opening

Lebanese-Turkish relations improved gradually after the war, but the most prominent transformation came with the Justice and Development Party coming to power in Türkiye in 2002. Ankara adopted a more open foreign policy toward its Arab surroundings and sought to expand its economic and political relations, after having remained for decades closer to the European and Atlantic space.

The visit of Lebanese Prime Minister, the late Rafic Hariri, to Türkiye in 2004 was an important milestone in revitalizing bilateral relations, followed by mutual official visits and contacts.

In the July 2006 war, Türkiye supported efforts to reach a ceasefire, provided humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, and then participated in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, UNIFIL, after Resolution 1701 was issued. It also contributed diplomatically to regional efforts to address the Lebanese political crisis that ended with the Doha Agreement in 2008, and provided financial support to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.

The rapprochement reached an important peak in 2010, with the mutual abolition of entry visas, which facilitated tourism, business, and people-to-people contact. A free trade agreement was also signed in November of the same year, although its entry into force remained pending the completion of Lebanese ratification procedures.

From 2011 to 2024: Syria Redraws the Calculations

The Syrian war that erupted in 2011 complicated the regional scene and was reflected in Lebanese-Turkish relations. Ankara adopted a position opposed to the Bashar al-Assad regime, while the Lebanese were divided over the Syrian crisis, particularly in light of Hezbollah’s military involvement alongside the regime.

This was accompanied by a growing Turkish social and humanitarian presence, particularly in Tripoli and Akkar, through aid and cultural and development projects. This presence raised questions among some Lebanese circles about the nature of the Turkish role, between those who saw it as a legitimate extension of historical relations, and those who considered it an attempt to expand political influence, particularly within the Sunni environment.

But official relations were not interrupted. The Turkish Foreign Minister visited Beirut in 2019, Turkish solidarity was evident after the Beirut port explosion in 2020, and mutual visits continued in the following years.

2025 – 2026: Toward a Partnership Beyond Traditional Relations

The fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime in December 2024, and the regional transformations that followed, opened new horizons for the Turkish role in the Levant, which was reflected in Lebanon’s position in Ankara’s calculations. July 2026 was a notable milestone, with the visit of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, then President Joseph Aoun, to Türkiye and their meetings with President Erdoğan. The talks focused on economic and security cooperation, support for the Lebanese Army, reconstruction, and the future of stability in the South. Ankara expressed its readiness to contribute to the security arrangements that may follow the end of the UNIFIL mission.

Economically, Turkish exports to Lebanon reached about $1.17 billion in 2025, compared to $132 million in Lebanese exports to Türkiye, according to official Turkish figures. This imbalance highlights the importance of developing Lebanese exports, rather than merely expanding imports.

Opportunities for cooperation exist in the sectors of energy, transport, industry, tourism, and reconstruction, particularly as Türkiye has a broad industrial base and significant expertise in implementing infrastructure projects.

Interests First… And History Should Not Be an Obstacle

Lebanese-Turkish relations are not merely an extension of a shared Ottoman memory, nor should they be reduced to religious or sectarian affiliations or circumstantial influence calculations. Türkiye today is a pivotal state in the region, a key member of NATO, and possesses economic, industrial, military, and diplomatic capabilities that make it an influential party in the equations of the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean.

It is in Lebanon’s interest to deal with this reality with political realism, away from preconceived alignments, and without its openness to Ankara coming at the expense of its Arab, European, or international relations. Lebanon’s strategic interests, politically and economically, require that its relations with Türkiye be at their best. Not from a position of dependency or subordination, but on the basis of parity, mutual respect, and shared interests.

Lebanon, which has paid heavy prices as a result of becoming an arena for others’ conflicts, needs to expand its network of friendships and partnerships, not to replace one axis with another.

And if history brought Lebanese and Turks together for long centuries under one authority, the future offers them a different opportunity: a relationship between two independent states, governed not by the legacy of the Sultanate, but by the logic of sovereignty, cooperation, and mutual interest.

This, ultimately, is the criterion that should govern Lebanon’s relations with Türkiye, as with all influential states in its surroundings: to know its position, preserve the independence of its decision, and turn its foreign relations into a source of strength and prosperity, not into an additional cause of its internal divisions.