When the Administration Remains Silent: Does the Judiciary Protect Rights or Merely Declare Their Violation?

In a state of law, the legality of the administration is not measured only by the decisions it takes, but also by what it refrains from taking. A decision contrary to the law may be a visible assault on a right, while administrative silence turns into a less visible, more complex means of obstructing rights without explicit refusal or direct assumption of responsibility.

And in Lebanon, where transactions and requests may remain pending for months or years, an issue arises that goes beyond administrative slowness to the essence of the relationship between authority and citizen: Does the administrative official have the freedom not to exercise a power granted to him by law? And if the Council of State rules that his abstention is unlawful, is annulling this abstention sufficient, or should the judiciary possess means to guarantee the execution of its judgment and repair the resulting damage?

Administrative Competence is a Legal Duty, Not a Personal Privilege

Administrative competence is granted to achieve the public interest, not to satisfy the will of its holder. The official does not own his powers as private property, but exercises a legal function whose scope and purpose the legislator has defined. Administrative law distinguishes between restricted competence, where the law imposes taking a specific decision when its conditions are met, and discretionary power, which allows the administration to choose between lawful solutions according to the facts and the requirements of the public interest.

However, discretionary power does not mean arbitrary power, and does not necessarily grant the administration freedom to refrain from deciding on requests. The content of the decision may be left to its discretion, while the duty to examine it remains. The essential distinction is not between an administration that has power and one that does not, but between a power exercised within the law and a power whose non-exercise is used to obstruct its purpose. A power granted by law to achieve a public interest may not be transformed into a means of withholding that interest.

The Administration’s Silence Between Implicit Refusal and Illegality

The Lebanese legislator organized the effects of the administration’s silence in Article 68 of the Council of State system, issued by Decree No. 10434 dated 14 June 1975, which considers, in principle, the administration’s silence on a request for a period of two months as an implicit decision of refusal, subject to legal exceptions. Article 69 sets the deadline for judicial review of this decision, which is, as a general rule, two months starting from the end of the legally specified silence period.

Thus, the legislator transformed silence into an administrative position subject to appeal, so that the citizen does not remain a prisoner of unlimited waiting. But implicit refusal is not void merely because it is implicit, as the assessment of its legality depends on the nature of competence, the facts, and the applicable legal provisions. Illegality may arise from violation of a legal duty, or error in applying texts, or deviation of power when it is proven that competence was directed towards an unlawful purpose.

Here appears the importance of distinguishing between mere non-response to a request, and abstention from taking a decision which the law imposes to take.

Is Annulment of the Unlawful Decision Sufficient?

Annulment of the refusal decision does not necessarily erase the damages it caused. Abstention from issuing a license that meets its conditions, or unlawful delay in settling a job status, may lead to material losses or other damages that annulment alone does not remedy.

Hence arises the administration’s liability for service fault, when fault, damage, and causal link between them are proven, according to the rules governing the liability of public legal persons. However, compensation does not automatically follow annulment of the decision, because the liability claim differs in its conditions and subject from the annulment review for exceeding the limits of power. Annulment aims to remove the unlawful decision from the legal system, while compensation aims to repair the damage caused by the administration. And effective judicial protection is not complete by declaring a violation of the law, if the victim remains bearing alone its consequences.

Articles 91 and 93… Between Administration Independence and Binding Judgments

The relationship between Articles 91 and 93 of the Council of State system raises a delicate issue. Article 91 prevents the Council from substituting itself for the competent administrative authority to take decisions resulting from the legal situations it declares. In contrast, Article 93 affirms the binding nature of its judgments, obliges execution of final judgments within a reasonable period, and allows judgment of a coercive fine in case of unjustified delay, upon the request of the victim. It also provides for a financial penalty against the employee who uses his authority or influence to obstruct execution of the judgment, according to the mechanism specified therein.

Here emerges the tension between respecting the administration’s competence and ensuring the effectiveness of the judiciary. Preventing the judge from substituting for the administration is based on the distribution of functions between authorities, but this distribution may not be transformed into immunity for the administration from executing judicial judgments. Separation of powers protects the independence of constitutional functions, and does not justify the independence of any authority from the rule of law.

Fifth: France and Egypt… What Does the Comparison Reveal?

The French experience provides a model for developing the effectiveness of judicial oversight. Article L.911-1 of the French Administrative Justice Code allows the judge to issue an order to take a specific executive measure when the judgment necessarily requires it, while Article L.911-2 allows obliging the administration to reconsider and take a decision within a specified period. Article L.911-3 allows attaching the order to a coercive fine. Thus, the French judge does not merely declare illegality, but can, within legal controls, determine the requirements for executing his judgment, without absolutely substituting for the administration.

As for Egypt, Article Ten of the State Council Law No. 47 of 1972 considers the administration’s refusal or abstention from taking a decision it was obliged to take as an administrative decision. The importance of this text lies in linking the negative decision to the existence of a prior legal obligation, not to mere non-response of the administration to the citizen’s request.

The comparison reveals that the effectiveness of administrative judiciary depends on two complementary matters: determining when abstention becomes unlawful, and providing the means capable of ending its effects.

Towards a Legislative Amendment that Strengthens the Effectiveness of the Judiciary

Protecting rights does not require abolishing the administration’s independence, but defining its limits when it collides with the duty to execute judicial judgments. Hence, amending Article 91 can be proposed to allow the Council of State, when its judgment necessarily requires taking a specific measure, to order the administration to take it within a certain period, provided it does not substitute for it in exercising a discretionary power reserved to it by law.

The Council should also be enabled to order reconsideration of the request within a specified period, when the new decision depends on a lawful administrative discretion. The effectiveness of Article 93 can be strengthened by facilitating the procedures for requesting the coercive fine and monitoring execution of judgments, and linking unjustified delay to liability according to its legal conditions. Thus, the judiciary does not become an alternative administrative authority, but a guarantee preventing the judicial judgment from remaining a mere theoretical declaration.

A Right That Is Not Executed Remains a Right with Incomplete Protection

The state of law is not complete by recognizing rights, nor by merely allowing appeal against violating decisions, but by the existence of a judiciary capable of providing effective protection for these rights. Administrative abstention may constitute a violation, and may entail liability for compensation, but the defect reaches its peak when abstention continues after the issuance of a final judicial judgment.

And if the law prevents the administration from taking a violating decision, it may not allow it to hide behind silence to evade a mandatory decision. Justice that can declare the right, and does not possess sufficient means to guarantee its respect, remains incomplete justice; and a state of law that tolerates obstruction of its judicial judgments makes rights hostage to the will of the administration instead of making the administration subject to the law.

Legal and Judicial Sources and References

First – Lebanese Legislation and Jurisprudence

  1. Council of State System, Decree No. 10434 dated 14 June 1975, in particular Articles 68, 69, 91 and 93, and amendment of Article 93 by Law No. 259/1993.
  2. Lebanese Council of State, Decision No. 136/2019 dated 21 November 2019, regarding the limits of the Council’s oversight on refusal to issue a decree related to Lebanese nationality, and application of Article 91.

Second – French Legislation
3. Code de justice administrative, Articles L.911-1, L.911-2 and L.911-3, relating to execution orders and coercive fines.

Third – Egyptian Legislation and Jurisprudence
4. Egyptian State Council Law No. 47 of 1972, Article Ten, in particular the paragraph related to negative administrative decisions.
5. Egyptian Supreme Administrative Court, Appeal No. 8364 of 48th Supreme Judicial Year, session of 2 April 2008, regarding conditions for the existence of a negative administrative decision and the necessity of a legal obligation on the administration.

Lawyer Michel Fallah